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Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare [Daniel M. Hausman] on * FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. This book is about preferences, principally.
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Seller Inventory APC Ships with Tracking Number! Buy with confidence, excellent customer service!. Seller Inventory Xn. Items related to Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare. Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare. Publisher: Cambridge University Press , This specific ISBN edition is currently not available. View all copies of this ISBN edition:. Synopsis About this title This book is about preferences, principally as they figure in economics.

Book Description : This book is about preferences, principally as they figure in economics. About the Author : Daniel M. Buy New Learn more about this copy. Other Popular Editions of the Same Title.

Search for all books with this author and title. Customers who bought this item also bought. Stock Image. New Hardcover Quantity Available: Book Depository hard to find London, United Kingdom. Seller Rating:. If I see no reason to do X, I will try to sup- press my desire to do it. A fervent desire to eat mouse droppings sends peo- ple to a therapist rather than to their mouse-infested basement cupboards.

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Regardless of how value is to be understood, deliberation forces deliberators to regard values, like facts, as realities with which actions must come to terms, not as psychological crotchets. They look at behavior from a third-person perspective, where explanatory and predic- tive questions are paramount.

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But if reasons govern deliberation, third-person accounts cannot ignore reasons. Moreover, there must be a close connection between the reasons that justify actions and the beliefs and desires in terms of which others predict and explain them. The need for a connection does not imply that beliefs and desires be reasons.

Philosophy of Economics III.2: Hausman 2012, chpt. 2

Beliefs and desires can explain why facts and values constitute reasons for action without the beliefs and desires themselves being part of the reason Schroeder , chapter 2. See also Stich See especially Bratman , , a. Beliefs are linked to reasons, because beliefs purport to provide agents with facts, and facts can be reasons. The connection between desire and value is less clear.

EconPapers: Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare

Why should it be that there is typically reason to do what one desires to do? On this view, desire motivates action and is prima facie evidence that there is reason to seek its object. On this view of desire, there is an additional important distinction between desires and preferences. Desires provide prima facie evidence that there is reason to seek their objects. Satisfying a whim may be reason enough if doing so is not otherwise ill-advised.

When those reasons appear not to exist, indi- viduals take steps to purge themselves of their distorted desires.

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  5. Preferences are not like this. As total or overall evaluations, they are already informed by reflection on what there is reason to do. They are the outcome of a compara- tive assessment, rather than inputs into deliberation like desires. From a first-person perspective, facts and values rather than beliefs and desires count as reasons. If Jill is not at the library, then Jack has no reason to go there. If he believes she is there, he thinks he has a reason, but he is mistaken. In addition, questions about the causes of behavior are, from this perspective, at least as important as questions about what justifies behavior.

    So the social scientist is interested in beliefs and desires or beliefs and preferences as both causes of behavior and reasons for behavior. Figure 1. Facts and values are reasons for action.

    They serve as premises in deliberation. The right-hand side represents the situation as a third party sees it. Beliefs and preferences are both reasons for action and causes of actions as well as causes of other beliefs and preferences. As a commentary on social science and especially economics , this book will mainly adopt a third-person perspective, and, when speaking of reasons, I shall usually take them to consist of preferences and beliefs.

    Reasons for actions do not always explain actions. Better to be at Better to be at Value the library than the library than Preference to stay home. Nothing else is Nothing else is better about Go to the better about Go to the staying home library. Reasons and causes. Donald Davidson has argued com- pellingly that the difference between reasons that explain actions and reasons that do not explain actions is causal: Reasons that explain actions are also causes of the actions they explain. Reasons that do not explain actions may still serve to justify or rationalize actions, to show what makes actions rational.

    Given that preferences or the facts and values that ground them serve as reasons for actions, theories of choice should show how they do so. Theories of choice that purport to identify reasons for choice must be theories of ratio- nal choice. As empirical theories, they must also describe choice behavior and its causes. Although the normative adequacy of a theory of action is a sepa- rate question from its empirical adequacy, normative considerations influence empirical theorizing.

    Modeling behavior in terms of preferences and beliefs is an attractive path for the other social sciences as well. My quarrels are less with how economists employ the concept of preferences than with how economists have described what they are doing.